Kevin of Reno

Some business are creating whole departments or divisions to tackle the company’s social media platforms. This is a mistake. Certainly you should dedicate resources: time, money, and people to social media, but it should not be a stand alone entity. Social media exists as an extension of, or new avenue to, existing relationships with your clientele.

You might have an intern solely in charge of the company’s Twitter or Facebook and might check up on her once or twice a day. Would you put one intern solely in charge of email? How about phone calls? Social media platforms are  tools… just like email and phone. They need to be integrated into the larger goals of the organization and the people running them should not be interns, but rather brand managers who understand the image the company hopes to cultivate.

American Political Development (APD) is a unique subfield within political science. Neither the political history of the United States nor a source of data for the testing of theoretical assumptions, APD is, as I understand it, the analysis of our current polity explained by historical context. It provides framework for understanding issues, conflict, and dilemmas through the changes that produced them. This paper seeks to explain the core features of APD as outlined by Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, demonstrate the value of APD, critique what I perceive to be weaknesses of APD, and present an international example of political development that I believe is illustrative of the subfield.

Orren and Skowronek identify four core features that distinguish APD from other political sciences. First, APD analyzes American politics through intensive research in American history. Other forms of political science might focus on how the structure of our polity affects policy or how rational choice affects the decision making of political actors or how theoretical constructs of governance are played out in actuality, but APD alone views our current polity within its historical context. This historical prospective allows us to understand the broader implications of history on the polity, which is the second core feature Orren and Skowronek identify.

For example, the current debate on health care takes place within the structural constraints inherent in our legislature, but it is also influenced by historical trends and events. APD scientists would argue that one cannot completely understand the health care debate without understanding the historical context (such as wage-freezes during WWII) that created the system that we seek to reform today. Pure political scientists would seek to explain it not by examining the change that produced the situation but by understanding the unwritten rules and theoretical framework that produce government.

When APD scientists examine how historical events influenced situations like our current health care debate, they also tend to engage in comparative research – the third core feature of APD. Examining how countries such as Canada or England developed universal health care coverage provides valuable lessons to understanding why the United States did not. This practice of comparative study also lends itself to examining “what if” scenarios within American history. APD scientists might examine: What if the socialist movement had gained traction in the United States as it did in Europe? How would have this affected our current views of government responsibility?

The fourth, and final, core feature of APD is the tendency to identify patterns of consistency throughout our nation’s political development. Due to their resilience in American polity, these patterns are subjected to the most examination and study by APD scientists. Some examples include our reverence of and deference to the constitution, the widespread acceptance of liberalism as the prevailing ideology in the United States, and the stability of the two-party system.

Perhaps the interest in these constants comes from APD’s view of political development as ever changing. If APD scientists research how certain aspects of our polity came to be over time, it would be worth examining why other aspects do not change. Understanding why something has not changed can help inform those attempting to change it. I believe this is where APD offers the greatest value.

If we return to the current debate over universal health care coverage, we can demonstrate the value of APD. The debate is an example of what Orren and Skowronek call a “present-day controversy whereby history can be seen to bear directly on.” If one hopes to pass health care reform, it would behoove him or her to understand the historical context that informs the current situation. As the authors point out, all political change precedes prior political practices, rules, and leaders. To best achieve the change they want, reformers should understand prior attempts at health reform, the events that linked health insurance to employers, and the culture of government non-intervention that permeates American political culture. This deep of a historical understanding of the dilemma supersedes traditional political science.  It views every state of affairs as constantly in transition and development as inevitable.

However, I believe APD is limited in its legitimacy because it is always backwards looking. Whereas Mayhew’s explanation of Congress as “single-minded seekers of reelection” has certain predictive behaviors in the sense that we can model future actions taken by Congress, APD can only tell us how we got to the point we are currently at.

APD scientists might try their hands at predicting political outcomes (for example, the success of true health care reform seems unlikely given past failed attempts and the enduring presence of liberal ideology), but such models are not legitimate because the instant the outcome changes, so too does the evidence which supported the model. What I mean is this: An APD scientist examining the two-party system would examine all of the historical influences that led to and maintained the two-party system. He or she would cite the division between the federalists and anti-federalists, the winner-take-all provisions of the constitution, the rivalry between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, and the institutional barriers to third parties as reasons not only why America only has two parties but also why it is likely to stay that way. However, if America were to develop a viable third party, the historical events that served as data points for explaining our polity are suddenly changed to support the new conclusion, which is a three-party system.

If this situation seems too hypothetical, let me provide a real example. APD research in the 1970’s would likely have focused on how and why America became a progressive, left-leaning country. APD scientists would point to the New Deal, the Great Society, expansion of civil liberties, and the Warren Court as possible evidence for their theory. Their research would draw a clear line of development to the point from which they looked back. I doubt few, if any, of these hypothetical scientists could have predicted the rise of conservatism that coincided with the election of Ronald Reagan. Yet, any APD scientist in the 80’s would be able to draw their own new line (or as one scholar put it, “the right line”) to the current polity. Such a line would incorporate the liberal ideology of Americans dating back to Tocqueville, the nomination of Barry Goldwater, and a widespread desire to counteract progressive reforms.

Unlike other forms of political science, which seem to build upon theories, APD is constantly building completely new lines of development based on the situation at hand. As Orren and Skowronek point out, APD, at times, tells us more about the period in which they were written than what actually preceded it.

For example, Woodrow Wilson’s critique of the constitution, which explained the strong and unchecked powers of Congress, was appropriate at the time he wrote it, but it neither bears any resemblance to nor provides any explanatory value to understand the Congress we have today. Further, if early APD scientists were so quick to abandon the role of Germanic influences on our democratic system with the start of WWI, one must wonder how legitimate and well constructed that theory could have been.

Under such limitations, APD appears to offer benefits and value to those seeking to understand the historical context that led to the present, but it offers little in terms of understanding the future.

Orren and Skowronek touch briefly on the use of international comparative framework to explain APD. They essentially state that different histories lead to different governing structures, which can explain different outcomes.

My international experience is limited, but I believe it is illustrative of the authors’ point. I spent a semester abroad in the United Arab Emirates. Compared to the United States, the UAE has a very paternalistic government. The government provides approximately $40,000USD per year in health care, education, and utility subsidies to Emiratis, $20,000 to those recently married, free land and tax free loans, guarantees jobs, and censors the internet and television. Citizens of the UAE expect their government to fulfill these obligations and roles because of their political development.

The UAE, up until approximately 50 years ago, was a Bedouin, tribal society. The tribal leaders gained legitimacy and political power by providing for the people. Spoils of war would be shared among the members of the tribe, earning their favor and trust. Although the country is no longer tribal, the importance of this historical political development is still seen. The tribal leaders – now official monarchs – share the profits from oil exports with the citizens and provide many social services. The political development of the country shaped a governing system in which the monarchs are seen as the legitimate rulers through their patronage of the people.

The UAE example is informative not only because the country’s political development is so condensed (it gained independence in 1971) and therefore easily examined, but also because it offers a comparative example from which we can draw conclusions about America’s political development. By contrasting where the US’s and the UAE’s historical evolutions diverged, APD scientists can better understand how they reached different outcomes.

Such distinctions and comparisons are valuable because a polity is more than just the current situation or political dilemma – it is a function of all the historical events which precede it.

Is the American Dream no longer possible? Two cars, a house, two kids (put through college), and a large enough nest egg to retire in comfort – those tangible things are supposed to be the corner-stone of the American middle class. Yet for many Americans, a dream is all they’ll ever be. It’s interesting that we have such a uniform standard for when you’ve “made it” for a society that prides itself for its diversity. We have diverse people with differing abilities yet expect them to all reach the same end. One has to wonder: Is it even possible?

David Brooks told the New York Times that the American dream is defined and only achieved by the highest quartile of citizens.

Cultural norms are thus set by the lucky 20 percent. Everybody else (we’re Americans, we don’t acknowledge class differences) measures their lifestyle according to the standards set by those top 20. To get the bigger house (which now seems normal) or the multiple cars or the flat screen, they go into debt. Pretty soon, kablooie.

Of course, part of the problem is most people think they’re the lucky 20 percent. According to Gallup, 57% of Americans making between $30,000-$49,000 identify themselves as “Haves” versus 36% as “Have-Not’s.” That range is where America’s median income and demonstrates our general optimism when it comes to our own wellbeing. 

However, just because you think of yourself as a “Have” doesn’t mean you can necessarily live the lifestyle of the “Haves.” I’m using Frank Luntz’s “The Average American: Meet Jennifer Smith” to study whether the Middle Class can achieve the earlier defined American Dream. Jennifer Smith is a white female, 36.4 years old, she earned her high school diploma, works in customer service, married to husband Michael with two kids, and has less than $2000 in savings. Her family income is $63,211 and she and her husband have a 30 year lease on a three bedroom home. Their mortgage payment is $1,508 a month and they own two cars (one of which is paid off). $22,000 or more goes directly to either their home payment or car loan. Even with their dependents, they’ll owe $4000 in federal income taxes. They’ll owe $3500 in property taxes. About $6000 will go to SS and medicare. Total, they’ll have  approximately $26000 in expendable income.

It seems that the Smiths can comfortably live the American dream. Although there are certainly millions of Americans that live in poverty, for the median American, a comfortable suburban life is still achievable.